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Cox: Revision of the Taft-Hartley Act

REVISION OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT*

O

ARCHIBALD Cox**

NE difficulty in discussing the Taft-Hartley Act is the wide
range and great variety of subjects which it covers-topics so unrelated as the outlawing of certain kinds of strikes and picketing,
union contributions and expenditures for political purposes, the
creation of a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the
elimination of Communist control of labor organiaztions. A second
obstacle is the danger of overlooking the forest in our fascination
by the trees. The debates of 1947, the National Labor Relations
Board decisions and the congressional hearings have produced a
great number of issues hotly contested by the protagonistics, highly
interesting to the observer, yet withal a mass of detail. In a conference such as this it is important to back far enough away to
get a whole view with the hot little contests in proper perspective.
I propose to begin my discussion of Revision of the Taft-Hartley
Act by asking where we are and how we got here. We shall then
be in a position to examine a second question: How large is the
area of agreement on a national labor policy? How does it compare to the areas of dispute? In my judgment the great bulk of the
American people, including the responsible leaders of management
and labor, are agreed on the fundamental elements of a national
labor policy; the disputes go to technical questions and to matters
of judgment or detail. If this opinion is correct-and I hope to
persuade you that it is correct-should not the administration
abandon its plan of revising the Taft-Hartley Act at this session
of Congress and establish a commission drawn from the House
and Senate labor committees, responsible yet moderate spokesmen
of labor and industry and informed members of the public who
have no commitment to management or union? I am confident
that such a body, given time and a competent staff, could lift the
issues out of the atmosphere of political rivalry and reach an
informed consensus of opinion. Legislation written in this manner
would have more permanent value than a law which either business or labor felt has been imposed upon it without real consideration of all sides of the question.
* Address delivered at the Third Annual Labor Relations Conference held
at West Virginia University, April 11, 1953.

*0 Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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During the latter part of the nineteenth century labor organizations began to achieve sufficient coherence and economic strength
to be vital forces in the community. As the unions' ability to conduct successful strikes increased, as the ranks of organized labor
swelled from 250,000 members in 1886 to 2,000,000 in 1914 and
5,000,000 in 1920, thQ differences between employers and employees
intruded upon the public consciousness. It became necessary to
develop a public labor policy.
Initially the national labor policy was formulated by the
judiciary. There is no need to relate in detail the familiar story
of the growth of the labor injunction. The courts enjoined the
unions from pursuing "unlawful objectives" or lawful objectives
by "unlawful means.", The formula is plausible enough; the
catch is that "unlawful" was used in an entirely Pickwickian sense.
When the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that a
union which struck to compel United Shoe Machinery Company
to bargain collectively was pursuing an unlawful objective, the
court did not mean that the union was committing a crime or
trying to induce the employer to commit a crime; the objective was
unlawful only in the sense that the judges believed that the desire
to secure from United Shoe an agreement to bargain collectively
was not a sufficient reason for injuring the company's business by
a strike.2 Similarly peaceful picketing was held to be an unlawful
means of carrying on a labor dispute, ' not because picketing
violated any statute or ordinance but because the judges disapproved of it. These are extreme examples but if time permitted
recounting the cases I am sure that you would all be persuaded
that the courts showed little comprehension of labor's needs or the
ways of industrial life. Moreover, the first step in each case was
likely to be the issuance of a preliminary order based upon papers
submitted by the employer's attorney without hearing the union's
side of the case.
In strikes large enough to affect the national economy, these
legal principles were supplemented by the decision in the Debs
case 4 which permitted the government to enjoin such a strike
1 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327 (1921).
2 United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 287 Mass. 537, 130 N.E. 86
(1921).
3 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
4 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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regardless of the merits of the underlying dispute.
For our purposes the important point to observe is that the
struggle against the labor injunction culminated in pretty general
acceptance of the first of four major principles on which our labor
policy is founded. The principle was that law has only a peripheral
role to play in adjusting the conflicting interests of business and
labor. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 19325 is the highwater mark
of this development for it immunized in the federal courts all
peaceful labor activities.
"So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not
combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit ... are
not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom
or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or
unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities
are the means."'
Later the Supreme Court seemed to be about to write at least
some of this philosophy into constitutional law.7 There even
developed considerable tolerance for violence and other activities
unhesitatingly punished in the absence of a labor dispute.
"A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons.
Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to
the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words
lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation from
economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest
is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight.
Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted,
must have been in the contemplation of Congress when it
provided in Section 13 of the [Wagner] Act that nothing
therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not so,
the rights afforded to employees by the Act would be indeed
illusory."8
The philosophy behind the labor legislation of the nineteen
thirties was deeply rooted in the disappointing experience of half
a century of legal intervention into industrial conflicts. In a
democracy sanctions can be invoked only against the occasional
wrongdoer. The effectiveness of law depends upon its acceptance
G47 STAT. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ Ill et seq.

6 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1940).
7 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321
(1941).
8 Republic Steel Corp. v. NLR.B, 107 F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir. 1939).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1953

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [1953], Art. 3
94

REYISION OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY A CT

by the governed, either because they approve the policy which it
expresses or because it is the law. To enforce a judicial edict
against large numbers of employees is out of the question. There
was, and is, no consensus of opinion about the propriety of
labor's various objectives or of the weapons with which they are
pursued. In each instance the decision, whether statutory or judgcmade, too obviously involves policy judgments, and feelings run
too high, for it to command acquiescence merely because it is law.
Hence Congress turned the policy of relying for the adjustment of
industrial conflicts upon negotiation between employers and labor
organizations strong enough to bargain effectively on behalf of employees. Judicial intervention into strikes, boycotts or picketing
was prohibited partly because it did nothing to resolve the underlying problems and partly because the injunction was traditionally
a weapon for weakening employee organization. As a result of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, unions enjoyed virtual immunity from
regulation during the decade and a half prior to the Taft-Hartley
legislation.
The second major development in labor law in response to the
emergence of labor unions was the recognition of legally protected
rights to organize and bargain collectively. They can be traced
back to the 1895 report of the United States Strike Commission"
and the enactment of the Erdman Act10 through the principles
declared by the first National War Labor Board in 191811 to the
NRA 12 and ultimately to Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935.13 The NLRA embodied three principles:
(1) Employees should be protected by the government
against any form of employer coercion or interference with
their forming, joining or assisting labor organizations.
(2) The bargaining representatives designated by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate unit should be
the exclusive representative of all the 'employees in the unit.
9 U.S. Strike Comm., Report on the Chicago Strike of June-July,

1894

(1894).

10 Act of June 1, 1898, 30 STAT. 424.
11 Secretary of Labor, Annual Report for 1918, p. 192: "The right of

workers to organize in trade-unions and to bargain collectively through chosen

representatives is recognized and affirmed. This right shall not be denied,
abridged or interfered with by the employers in any manner whatsoever ..
"
12 Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 198,
provided that every code of fair competition should include the following
provision: That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
13 49 STAT. 449 (1935).
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(3) The employer must bargain with the representative
designated by a majority of the employees and, at least until
an impasse is reached, wages, hours and conditions of employment should be established only by joint determination.
Nothing in the Wagner Act curtails the virtual immunity from
regulation that the Norris-LaGuardia Act conferred upon labor
unions.
The third great principle of our national labor policy as it
developed prior to 1947 was that the government should not concern itself with the way in which collective bargaining was conducted or with the terms negotiated between company and union,
except in times of national emergency. We staked our welfare
on the belief that the conflicting interests of management and
labor should be adjusted only by private negotiations, backed
where necessary by resort to economic weapons, without the intervention of law.

III

When the Taft-Hartley Act is appraised against this background, one reaches the rather startling conclusion that what some
regarded as a panacea and others labeled a "slave labor law" did
not in fact make any major departure from the national labor
policy we had been developing a period of years. Some exceptions to the first principle were created. Sections 206-210 revive
the labor injunction in national emergency disputes-a problem I
shall discuss at the end of my remarks if time permits. Section. 8 (b)
outlaws the following concerted activities:
(1) violence and intimidation;
(2) secondary boycotts; i.e. the refusal to work for employer
A unless he ceases to do business with employer B, with whom the
union has its real clispute;
(3) strikes to compel an employer to commit some unfair
labor practice such as discharging an employee for belonging (or
not belonging) to a particular union, or bargaining with the
striking union after the NLRB has certified a different representative;
(4) jurisdictional strikes over work assignments.
The weapons thus withheld, especially the secondary boycott,
have been important to certain unions in the past. A strong case
can be made for the proposition that Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B)
goes too far in some respects, as when it compels employees to
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work on goods farmed out from a struck establishment 4 or requires union mechanics and laborers in the construction industry
to work on the same building with nonunion men. 15 It is easy
to show the futility, even the harmfulness, of the procedures for
handling jurisdictional disputes for they undermine instead of
supporting the private, non-governmental machinery established
by employers and unions. On the other hand, two contrary points
seem infinitely more significant. The points at which the TaftHartley Act revives legal intervention into every-day disputes are
trivial in comparison to those it leaves untouched. Also, the law
intrudes only in areas where the overwhelming consensus of opinion
condemns the unlawful conduct. This is clearly true of violence
and strikes to compel the commission of unfair labor practices.
While the jurisdictional dispute provisions are faulty, there is
almost unanimous agreement upon the wisdom of outlawing the
jurisdictional strike. Even in the field of secondary boycotts, there
is quite general agreement that some secondary boycotts should
be forbidden by law; the debate is over where to draw the line.
Nor has there been any serious departure from the second
major postulate of labor policy-the recognition and protection of
the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining. Proof of
the law's adherence to the essential thesis of the Wagner Act is
found in the fact that the five substantive unfair labor practices
created by the original Act remain unchanged save only in two
respects: (a) the amendments guaranteed employers a measure of
free speech which the NLRB had denied' and (b) employers were
relieved of the duty to bargain about changes in an existing agreement to take effect before the agreement expired." I do not mean
to imply that the Taft-Hartley Act made no significant changes nor
to suggest that the changes made were improvements. In borderline cases the scope of the Act was reduced. Technical legal doctrines were introduced that might have hindered enforcement of
the Act if the NLRB and courts had not simply ignored the
changes.'
The separation of the General Counsel from the Board
14 It has been held that the statute does not reach such a situation [Douds
v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)].
Senator Taft has introduced a bill making the exception plain. S. 655, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess., Section (f).
i5 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
16 Section 8 (c).
1.7 Section 8 (d).
is These changes are discussed in Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor-Manage.
ment Relations Act, 61 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 14-15 (1947).
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divided authority, gave rise to unseemly rows and must have
reduced the efficiency of the entire organization. Such errors should
be corrected. Debate concerning the remedies is inevitable. Nevertheless, the differences are inconsequential in comparison with the
wide area of agreement. Except to grant employers freedom of
expression, no responsible person has yet suggested repealing or
modifying any of the unfair labor practices forbidden under the
Wagner Act in order to protect the organization of labor unions.
In the view of some observers the most important development
portended by the Taft-Hartley law is the extension of government
regulation into new areas theretofore left to private adjustment.
The internal affairs of labor unions became matters of public
concern at least to the point of requiring unions seeking NLRB
assistance to eliminate any avowed Communist officers and to file
financial reports with the Secretary of Labor.19 The statute manifested public concern with the administration of collective agreements by facilitating actions to recover damages for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement. 20 It deals with the procedure of
collective bargaining by prescribing a series of notice periods to
be observed before a strike. 21 Most important, the provisions relating to welfare funds and union security regulate the terms that
may be included in collective bargaining agreements. The TaftHartley Act is the first instance in which our government has
undertaken to settle by law, for the benefit of one side or the other,
issues of labor relations previously resolved by collective bargaining.
I fully share the deep concern that others feel about crossing this
line, yet we are bound to confess that our chief concern is with
what may follow once the line is crossed. Thus far the statute
remains substantially faithful to the principle that the wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment should be fixed by
private adjustment not government decree.
In summary, I submit to you that the enactment of the TaftHartley Act made no essential, major change in the three fundamental principles of our national labor policy.

19 Section 9 (f), (g), (h).
20 Section 301.
21 Section 8(d).
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IV
Why then did consideration of the Taft-Hartley law produce
a major political debate and arouse such strong emotions? In my
judgment there were two reasons:
First,organized labor, repeating the mistakes of business in the
mid-thirties, sought to retain the virtual immunity from government regulation that it enjoyed under the Norris-LaGuardia and
Wagner Acts. Congress and the bulk of the American people
rejected this view, believing that on some occasions labor had
abused its power. The outcome established a fourth basic principle
of labor policy which should never have been challenged-that the
activities of labor unions, like those of other groups, are subject to
regulation in the public interest.
Second, the Taft-Hartley debates aroused strong emotions
because those who believe in labor unions and collective bargaining
feared that the need for the prevention of abuses was being used
as a cover for an attempt to weaken and destroy the unions, and to
undermine collective bargaining. In my judgment the fear was
justified. The original Hartley bill contained numerous provisions
aimed at weakening unions, confining the area of collective bargaining and restricting use of traditional weapons of self-help.
The Senate amendments improved the bill measurably, but some
of the labor-baiting gimmicks survived. For example, in the case
of a strike before a 60-day notice period has expired, employees
lose the protection of the National Labor Relations Act, opening
the way to such vicious tactics as industrial espionage, discriminatory discharges and employer sponsored back-to-work movements.
The Section 9 (c) (8) prohibition against permitting replaced strikers
to vote could easily be used to destroy a local union.
Other provisions in the law seemed to me then as now to
threaten to prolong and intensify the struggle for union recognition
and collective bargaining. Several sections encourage employers
to drive a wedge between employees and the union.22 They express the mistaken philosophy that unions are outsiders having no
legitimate interest in a plant instead of the employees' own organizations formed because group action is their only effective method
of self-protection, self-advancement and self-expression. Too often,
as in the case of union security,2 3 health and welfare funds24 and
22
23
24

See e.g., Sections 8 (c), 8 (d), 9 (a) and 209 (b).
Section 8 (a) (3).
Section 802 .
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the adjustment of grievances, the Taft-Hartley law recognized a
serious problem but adopted the solution which would encourage
the employer to take a position antagonistic to the union.
V
The enactment of wise labor legislation depends upon the
abandonment of extreme positions. Organized labor must concede
that its activities are not above public control; it must recognize
the existence of problems. Responsible business leaders must deny
the extreme reactionary's desire for a labor law which preserves his
hope for a collapse of unions and the end of collective bargaining.
Moreover. just as I believe that the responsible leaders of organized
labor have in truth abandoned their extreme position, so am I
convinced that the great body of opinion among American businessmen accepts labor unions and institution of collective bargaining as vital forces in the community.
Among those who have abandoned the extreme positions, the
area of agreement is large and more important than the points of
dispute. I make this assertion because it seems to me that even
today there is overwhelming agreement upon the underlying principles. The dispute is about their technical application or matters
of detail. Let us consider several as examples.
I. Employees shall be guaranteed full freedom to form, join
and assist labor unions of their own choosing.
The principle implies the prohibition of all forms of employer
interference and the prevention of violence or coercion by labor
organizations. There is no serious controversy on either point
although there is real need for competent analysis of the statutory
and administrative doctrines implementing the guarantees. The
hottest debate is over the degree of self-expression permitted employers. In some sections of the country the most vicious kinds of
propaganda have been used to destroy labor unions.25 Perhaps the
unions are right in saying that the Board has granted employers
too much freedom to abuse the right of appeal to reason, although
I would rather risk erring on the side of freedom rather than curtailment of expression. On the other hand it may be argued that
the Board has thwarted the intent of Congress in setting aside
elections because employers have exercised their constitutional and
25 Many instances are collected in Taft-Hartleyism in Southern Textiles,
Statement of Isadore Katz, Esq. before Sub-Committee on Labor-Management
Relations of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 1950.
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statutory privilege; 2 or in forbidding employers to require employees to listen to speeches on company property unless the union
is accorded a similar opportunity.27 Granting the importance of
the topic, I submit that it is a measure of our fundamental agreement that this is the only open, substantive issue of any consequence
in the whole field of protecting employee organization.
2. There is a recognizablepublic interest in the prohibition of
wasteful strikes and picketing.
This too is a principle which no one would seriously challenge. I discussed it earlier in tracing the development of our
national labor policy and sought to show not only that the points
at which the Taft-Hartley Act revives legal intervention into everyday disputes are trivial in comparison to those it leaves untouched
but also that the law has intruded only where the overwhelming
consensus of opinion condemns the unlawful conduct. The point
must be conceded in the case of violence, strikes to compel the
commission of unfair labor practices, and jurisdictional disputes.
Nor is there much controversy over the basic purpose of the re-

maining provisions outlawing concerted activities-to protect neutral employers and the community against spreading the economic
losses of a labor dispute by secondary boycotts. Sections 8(b)(4)(A)
and (B) have given rise to more difficulty in the administration
than any other provision. Nearly everyone who has studied the
subject wants changes in one direction or another. For example,
it is my personal opinion that a secondary employer surrenders
his neutrality by undertaking to do work which would ordinarily
be done in an establishment where the employees are on strike,
hence I approve Senator Taft's amendment relaxing this aspect
of the present prohibition.2 8 I would also make it plain that employees in the construction industry may picket a job where nonunion men are employed without having the NLRB brand their
picket lines unfair secondary boycotts because the practice is to
erect buildings through a series of subcontracts instead of a single
large corporation with different departments to do the work."
On the other hand, I would tighten up the present law by making
it plain that it is an unfair labor practice to threaten to strike a
General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124 (1948).
Bonwit Teller Co., 96 NLRB 608 (1951) enforced 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
1952); Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc., 101 NLRB No. 171 (1953).
28 S. 655, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. Section (f).
29 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
26
27
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secondary employer if he continues to handle hot goods3" and by
providing that a refusal to work on hot goods does not cease to be
an unfair labor practice merely because the employer has signed
a collective agreement consenting to the refusal.3 ' The point
which I would emphasize, however, is not the correctness of my
opinions. It is that the differences of opinion deal with essentially
minor matters on which reasonable men may differ. No one with
a sense of tolerance or a grain of humor can dogmatically assert that
on this kind of question only his view is correct. Moreover, the
issues are detailed. They are technical. They involve matters
of degree. We should not allow such differences to prevent
reaching a consensus of opinion upon major issues.
3. Wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment should be fixed by free collective bargaining. Except in
periods of national emergency the government should not regulate
directly or indirectly the terms of collective bargainingagreements.
There are few who will quarrel with this proposition stated
in general form, and not many who seek exceptions. Yet the TaftHartley law was the first occasion on which the Congress regulated
the terms that might be included in collective agreements for the
purpose of settling in favor of one side or the other specific issues
which had theretofore been left to discussion and the interplay of
economic forces.
One illustration is Section 302, which prescribes the conditions on which employers and labor unions may establish trust
funds for the benefit of employees and their families. Since health,
welfare and pension funds represent large accumulations of money
held for the benefit of employees by union officials, there could be
little question of the wisdom of some form of government supervision similar to state regulation of mutual savings banks and mutual
insurance companies. No one should complain of public scrutiny
who holds other people's money. But when the regulation is cast
in terms of what a collective agreement may provide instead of
supervising the administration of whatever fund it may establish,
when the law sets up the employer as the watch dog for the protection of beneficiaries, it becomes a legislative attempt to resolve
collective bargaining issues. The bill introduced by Senator Taft
F.2d
(2d Cir.
30 Conway's Express Inc. v. NLRB,
affirming 87 NLRB 972 (1949); Local 878, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 92 NLRB 253 (1950).
3' Authorities cited note 30 supra.
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to amend Section 302 would interject the government still further
by prohibiting the payment of moneys into a fund until its provisions had been reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Labor."2
Similar doubts arise concerning the Taft-Hartley prohibition
of the closed shop and its limitation reducing the union shop to a
device for securing financial support from all the employees in a
bargaining unit.s3 The 1947 hearings produced overwhelming
evidence of the need for some legislation upon the subject. Union
security agreements put enormous power in the hands of officials
chosen by a majority of the employees that may be used to oppress
individuals and minorities within the group. A few unions used
this power to establish job monopolies, to suppress fair competition
or to punish individuals with divergent political views. Although
the abuses are rare and most unions can be relied upon to correct
them, it is inconsistent with our democratic ideals to deny minorities
protection on the ground that the majority will not abuse its
power very often. But the union security question is not simply a
problem of minority rights. It has been fought out over the conference table and on the picket line because the union desired
security against internal disintegration and interunion rating,
while the employer wished to preserve his relative bargaining
power by denying this added strength to the employees' representative. Moreover, not every company opposes closed or union shop
agreements. Several weeks ago I was present at a meeting of
personnel men who were roundly scolding the government for not
outlawing all forms of union security. My rather mild objection
served to arouse only stronger feelings until one man in the back
of the room arose and said this,
"You don't really understand the problem. I was Personnel
Manager for a big western contractor. Any device by which a
union delivers the number of workers you want with the skills
you require 500 miles out in the sage brush where there just
wasn't anybody before you got there, all without cost to you,
is a damned good arrangement."
It is not my purpose to argue that union security is good or
bad. It is to ask you whether it is really desirable to have the issue
between employers and employees resolved by legislation instead
32

S. 658, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.

33 The views summarized here are set forth at greater length with appro-

priate documentation in Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 61 -ARv. L. REV. 274, 291-299 (1948).
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of bargaining. The uniformity inherent in any statutory rule is
not suited to an economy made up of an infinite variety of businesses with all sorts of needs and customs. The closed shop has
been abused in some industries; it serves no useful purpose in
others; but I cannot help thinking of my friend who wanted to hire
through the union because it relieved his construction company
of the need for recruiting labor. What is the objection to such an
arrangement provided that there are safeguards which prevent it
from being an instrument of oppression?
Another important aspect of the problem, perhaps, is embraced in the old aphorism, "What the government gives, the
government can take away." When unions went to a sympathetic
NLRB to expand the scope of collective bargaining, they themselves created the risk that industrialists would go to a sympathetic
Congress to curtail it. When industrialists lift the problem of
union security from the bargaining table into the Capitol, do they
not create the risk that the Congress may some day resolve the
issue, but in the opposite manner? In New Zealand and Saskatchewan a certified or registered union is entitled to maintenance of
membership or compulsory union membership by statute.
Let us leave the matter there. While the issue of union security will undoubtedly continue to perplex our labor relations, it
need not be an insuperable obstacle to solving other questions.
4. Individuals and minorities should be protected in their
civil liberties against the risk of arbitrary or oppressive action by a
labor union.
This fourth proposition is the corollary of what I said on the
issue of union security. Massachusetts grants an individual employee a right of administrative and judicial review of the action
of a labor organization which seeks his discharge under a closed
or a union shop contract because of his exclusion or expulsion
from the union. Unions are free to choose between foregoing
union security clauses and submitting to this degree of governmental review of their internal affairs. The American Civil
Liberties Union and other organizations would press the protection further and have the government review all exclusions and
expulsions. Balancing the freedom of a voluntary association to
select its members against the individhal worker's interest in
participating in the government of his industrial life through the
only available institution-by collective bargaining through the
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union-presents a difficult choice. Here again the point which
I would make is not that one conclusion is wiser than the other;
it is that the need of some protection is quite generally conceded.
5. Instead of prescribing uniform rules for all industries, the
Act should be amended to take account of the needs of industries
affected by special conditions.
I mention this point to re-emphasize the careful analysis of
particular problems which must precede any worthwhile revision.
The present law as interpreted by the NLRB invalidates most of
the collective bargaining agreements in the building and construction industry. Since employment is sporadic and employers and
employees migrate from job site to job site, contracts must be
negotiated before the jobs are manned; nevertheless the NLRB has
decided that no contract is valid unless representative number of
men are on the job. Similarly, although thousands of dollars and
hours of effort were expended, no method of conducting elections
has been found applicable to the generality of construction workers. It would be surprising if there were not similar problems in
other industries. Their discovery, devising methods of correction
and drafting of statutory langbage requires detailed, careful and
time-consuming study.
The principles outlined do not cover the whole field of labor
relations legislation. There are some glaring omissions. For
example, I have said nothing about the so-called "states rights"
amendment which would open strikes and picketing to state regulation even in industries otherwise subject to NLRB jurisdiction.
More detailed discussion, however, would serve only to multiply
the illustrations. "States rights"-to pursue this one example-is
an appealing political slogan but a rational judgment cannot be
passed upon the proposal until after careful study of forty-eight
state laws regulating strikes and picketing to discover just what
state regulation would involve, followed by an effort to appraise
the interplay between such laws and other federal policies. But
enough has already been said, I hope, to demonstrate the truth
of two propositions:
First, there is sufficient likelihood of reaching a real consensus
of opinion on the fundamentals of labor relations legislation to
justify a major effort to work out an agreement.
Second, the troublesome issues concern subordinate details.
They relate to matters of technique. They turn on qiiestions of
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degree. Most of all they require closer analysis of present NLRB
doctrines and better draftsmanship than went into the present
statute.
VI
If these conclusions are sound, they lead to a final suggestion:
Congress should abandon the plan to amend the Taft-Hartley Act
at this session. It should refer the issues to a commission with the
time and facilities for working out proposed legislation. The commission should be made up of members of the Senate and House
labor committees, leaders of organized labor and prominent industrialists who have participated for their own companies in
collective negotiations. The commission should also include a few
so-called "public members" drawn from men of experience in labor
relations. It should be adequately staffed by men of its own selection. Above all else it should be given time for calm deliberation
and private discussion. Rome was not built in a day. The Constitutional Convention admitted no reporters and, to the best of
my knowledge, no leaks appeared in gossip columns.
It may be objected that the millenium is not in sight, that
management and labor have made plain their disagreement, and
that the failure of the tripartite advisory body appointed by
Secretary Durkin proves the futility of such an effort. Two
answers seem appropriate:
First, the failure of Secretary Durkin's group seems attributable
to inept management rather than the impossibility of working out
agreement. Two indispensable conditions were lacking-time and
privacy. Prolonged consideration and delicate negotiation must
precede abandonment of positions which were publicly announced
for the purposes of leaving room for political maneuver.
Second, too much can be gained by achieving a measure of
agreement, to permit accepting less. A hundred years ago George
Bancroft wrote:
"The feud between the capitalist and laborer, the house of
Have and the house of Want, is as old as social union, but
those who can act with moderation, prefer fact to theory, and
remember that everything in this world is relative and not
absolute, will see that the violence of the contest may be stilled."
The War Labor Board and Wage Stabilization Board, despite their
mistakes and inadequacies, bear witness to what can be accomplished when men of good will attempt to resolve their differences.
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When our reason tells us that in the field of labor relations legislation there is fundamental and widespread agreement, should we
not seek first to develop and build upon that foundation? If we
succeed, the structure will be lasting. If we fail, nothing but
effort will have been expended.
VII
Discussion of the Taft-Hartley Act would be incomplete without a word about national emergency disputes. Section 206 empowers the President to appoint a Board of Inquiry whenever he
is of the opinion that a strike affecting a substantial part of an
interstate industry will "imperil the national health or safety."
The board is directed to make a factual report without recommendations for the settlement of the dispute. Thereafter the President
may direct the Attorney-General to secure an injunction against
the strike. Sixty days later the Board of Inquiry is to make another
report describing the parties' efforts to settle the dispute including
"a statement by each party of its position and a statement of the
employer's last offer of settlement. Fifteen days thereafter employees are to ballot on the question whether they wish to accept
this final offer of settlement. Regardless of the result, the injunction must be dissolved; and if the dispute is not settled, the
President must report to Congress.
It is my opinion that this scheme is unwise and is also unfair
to employees and labor unions. I would repeal it and substitute
a new law giving the President the widest possible discretion in
deciding (1) whether to intervene in a dispute and (2) what method
of intervention to follow. The soundness of these propositions is
demonstrated by both experience and analysis.
Certainly experience shows that the Taft-Hartley provisions
have contributed nothing to the settlement of emergency disputes.
They have been invoked on ten occasions since 1947. Work
stoppages were averted in four disputes but since one involved the
atomic energy workers at Oak Ridge who have never gone on
strike, one can scarcely give the Act credit for preventing a stoppage.
In seven cases injunctions were obtained and in four of the seven
the injunction did nothing to halt the stoppage. In the West
Coast Maritime and East Coast Dock disputes the stoppage was
delayed for the 80-day period but was resumed thereafter when the
Taft-Hartley machinery was exhausted. In the 1948 and 1950 coal
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strikes the United Mine Workers ignored the injunctions. There
is little reason to suppose that the Taft-Hartley procedures played
any important part in the settlements reached in the three cases
in which the President did not seek an injunction. In the Meat
Packing case a protracted strike took place but no injunction was
sought because only part of the industry was affected. In a telephone case a settlement was reached by collective bargaining
during suspension of the sittings of the Board of Inquiry, but there
is no reason to suppose that its members would have been less
effective mediators in other positions. One can fairly summarize
the data by saying that in four out of ten cases the Taft-Hartley
Act has demonstrated its futility. In a fifth case its machinery was
found inapplicable and in the others, so far as the eye can see, the
Act did not seriously affect the outcome.
It may be argued that these facts do no more than show that
the Taft-Hartley Act has done no good-that they fail to prove
that it is a positive evil. There are two answers to this contention.
First, before labor is deprived of its only effective bargaining
weapon by reviving the labor injunction even for an 80-day period,
we should expect something better of the law than that it not make
the settlement of disputes more difficult. Second, there is some
affirmative evidence that the Taft-Hartley Act prolonged several disputes and made their settlement more difficult. In the
West Coast Maritime strike there were indications that both
parties quickly provoked an impasse so that an injunction would
issue, then delayed any real bargaining during the 80-day period,
and finally settled their differences under the pressure of a strike.
It is also noteworthy that no real progress was made in settling the
1950 coal strike until Judge Keech's dismissal of a contempt citation
demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the Taft-Hartley injunction. '14
Analysis of the forces at work in national emergency disputes
also demonstrates the unsoundness of the Taft-Hartley provisions.
Negotiations between the management of a company and the
union representing its employees differ in one important respect
from buying and selling commodities in a competitive market. The
company must eventually hire back the employees, and the workers
must eventually work for this particular employer. Neither has a
practical alternative. Unlike the buyer of shoes or whiskey the
employer cannot go to another dealer if he does not like the price
34

United States v. United Mine Workers, 89 F. Supp. 179 (1950).
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the union offers. Equally, if the great mass of workers in a steel
mill do not like the employer's proposals, they cannot turn to
someone else who has a plant for them to work in who will pay
higher wages. Hence, while management and labor must eventually
agree, the terms of the agreement are scarcely the result of ordinary
competitive forces.
What is it then that brings management and labor together?
Negotiation tends to produce agreement or at least to narrow the
area of disagreement. Weariness often plays a part. The negotiators on both sides reach a stage where they would rather compromise than continue their diet of aspirin, cigarettes and coffee.
In the final analysis, however, what makes collective bargaining
work is the risks inherent in a strike. Where the stakes are high,
the bargain is never struck until there is no place else to go,
nothing left to do, no possible escape from choosing between compromise and battle. Experience has shown over and over again
that when government -supplies a procedure, management and
labor rarely trade out an agreement. Each side hopes that it may
get more favorable terms by following the procedure than by
settlement. To put it in a phrase, the strike or the fear of a strike
is the motive power that makes collective bargaining operate.
In most industries we are ready enough to accept this way of
fixing wages. It works pretty well on the whole and such economic
waste as results from strikes is more than offset by the advantages of
leaving business and labor free to work out their own agreements.
The trouble comes in those industries where a strike becomes intolerable to the public long before it serves its function of making
the parties'-management and labor-agreement on a voluntary
resolution of their differences-the railroads, electric light and power
utilities and the steel industry are ready examples.
It is this characteristic of the strike in critical industries that
creates almost insoluble difficulty in working out a method for
settling national emergency disputes, for we are now in this
dilemma: On the one hand collective bargaining can work only if
there are present the risks of a strike-and occasionally the cost of
an actual strike to bring the parties to an agreement. On the
other hand in certain industries a strike does so much harm that
we cannot permit it. We cannot wholly eliminate the risks of
strikes and at the same time preserve collective bargaining. Equally
we cannot discard collective bargaining without substituting a large
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degree of government regulation. We must pay for our freedom.
Under these conditions perhaps the best we can do is to
create uncertainties, pregnant with risks, as to the nature of any
government intervention for the standard procedure laid down by
the Taft-Hartley law. There should be substituted executive power
to choose between a wide range of alternatives. Give the President
discretion as to when to intervene; let him decide whether to
appoint a fact-finding board with power to make recommendations
or to take more drastic action; let him choose between seizure which
industry finds distasteful and the injunction which is so much disliked by labor; leave it uncertain whether the government will
change terms and conditions of employment or require continued
operation under existing conditions. A law which left the parties
so far in doubt would create pressures for settlement not present
in the existing statute.
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